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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940244-CA 
v. : 
ROGER L. STRADER, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered 
upon a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly find that the charges 
against defendant--possession of a controlled substance, theft, 
and giving false information to a police officer--did not arise 
from the same criminal episode? This issue challenges the trial 
court's interpretation of a statute, which presents a question of 
law reviewed by this Court using a correction-of-error standard. 
State v. Stettina, 868 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Phathammavonq. 860 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did entry of defendant's guilty plea to the false 
information charge bar subsequent prosecution of the theft and 
possession charges against defendant? This issue also raises a 
question of statutory interpretation and is reviewed under the 
same standard applicable to issue #1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 22, 1992, the West Valley City prosecutor 
charged defendant Roger L. Strader with giving false information 
to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990) (R. 128, Exh. D-2). Defendant 
entered a plea of guilty in the Third Circuit Court on September 
3, 1992, and was sentenced to ten days in jail and a $50.00 fine, 
with the jail term suspended upon timely payment of the fine (R. 
128, Exh. D-2)• 
On October 19, 1992, defendant was charged in the Third 
Judicial District Court with possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991); theft, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); and giving false 
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in 
2 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990) (R. 3, 11-13).x 
On November 22, 1993, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 
information, claiming that the prosecution was barred under 
sections 76-1-401 to -403, Utah Code Annotated, rule 9.5, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Utah Constitution (R. 31-
32). Following an evidentiary hearing on the same day, the trial 
court granted defendant's motion as to the false information 
charge, and denied the motion in all other respects (R. 34; 
Hearing Transcript [hereinafter »Tr,f] 121) .2 Defendant later 
pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), preserving his 
right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to dismiss 
(R. 41-47, 59). The theft count was dismissed, and the court 
sentenced defendant to pay a fine and serve a period of not more 
than five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 41-47, 60) . The 
court then suspended the sentence and placed defendant on parole 
for 36 months (id.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Near 11:00 p.m. on July 21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randle 
was completing some paperwork in his patrol car parked in an 
1
 On February 23, 1993, the State amended the information to 
reflect attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, and to dismiss the false information charge (R. 4, 
11) . Defendant pled guilty to the amended information (R. 4) . 
However, he was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on May 25, 
1993 (R. 5)• 
2
 The record reflects that the false information charge was 
dismissed before defendant was bound over to the district court (R. 
6) . 
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apartment parking lot in West Valley City (Tr. 87-88, 91). He 
looked up to see a car pull into the construction site south of 
him and the driver get out and enter a building on the site (Tr. 
87, 91). The driver exited the building shortly thereafter with 
something in his hands, put the object in the car, and pulled 
away (Tr, 87, 91). Officer Randle turned on his lights and made 
a traffic stop (Tr. 92). He found defendant Roger L. Strader in 
the driver's seat and a female in the passenger seat (Tr. 92-94). 
The officer first asked defendant for identification, but 
defendant did not have any; instead he gave the name Stanley Kent 
Strader and the birth date of March 1, 1953 (Tr. 92-93) . The 
officer then asked about the circular saw he could see in the 
back seat of the car (Tr. 93). Defendant claimed to have picked 
it up for his friend, Tony Ochoa (Tr. 93). 
The passenger offered to get defendant's 
identification, explaining that they lived in an apartment across 
the street from the construction site (Tr. 93). She left but did 
not return (Tr. 94). Instead, a man identifying himself as Tony 
Ochoa brought Officer Randle a wallet and pulled out a driver's 
license belonging to Earl S. Nesbitt (Tr. 94). The officer 
observed that the "skin" of the license had been pulled up and a 
picture of defendant placed underneath it (Tr. 94). At that 
point the officer arrested defendant for giving him false 
information, handcuffed him and placed him in his patrol car (Tr. 
95). The officer then requested a check of the license plate on 
defendant's car and discovered that it belonged to another 
4 
vehicle (Tr. 95). Because of defendant's arrest and the false 
registration, Officer Randle decided to impound the car (Tr. 95-
96). During an inventory search conducted at the construction 
site, the officer found a syringe containing clear fluid under 
the driver's seat and a packet of syringes inside the glove 
compartment (Tr. 96). He then radioed for a dog and had a canine 
search conducted (Tr. 96). The search revealed a syringe under 
the seatcover on the driver's seat containing residue (Tr. 97, 
100). Both syringes were later determined to contain 
methamphetamine (R. 47; Tr. 100). 
Meanwhile, another officer located the owner of the 
saw, who arrived at the construction site while defendant was 
still there and confirmed that the saw had been stolen (Tr. 97). 
Defendant was taken to the West Valley City police department 
and, after receiving his Miranda warnings, admitted that the 
syringe found under the seatcover was his and that Stanley was 
his brother's name; he denied everything else (Tr. 98-99). The 
West Valley City prosecutor filed charges shortly thereafter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The three offenses with which defendant was charged did 
not encompass a single criminal objective and, hence, did not 
arise from a single criminal episode as defined by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-401 (1990). Defendant speculates on appeal about possible 
objectives behind the false information offense. However, the 
only objective mentioned below was defendant's alleged wish to 
avoid being arrested for the other offenses, and that objective 
5 
has no record support. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that where a defendant commits a crime in order to 
avoid arrest for unrelated, prior criminal conduct, he is 
generally not entitled to have the offenses treated as arising 
from a single criminal episode. State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 
578 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant's assertion that the State conceded that the 
offenses arose from a single criminal episode by charging all 
three offenses in a single information in the district court was 
not raised below and is not properly before this Court. Further, 
the mere charging of multiple offenses in one document does not 
necessitate the conclusion that they arose from a single criminal 
episode. 
Finally, because the trial court properly concluded 
that the offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode, 
the district court prosecution was not barred by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-403 (1990), or rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS 
PROPER BECAUSE THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM DID 
NOT ARISE FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE 
A. Introduction 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied his motion to dismiss the theft and possession charges 
filed in the Third District Court after his false information 
conviction in circuit court. Br. of App. at 10-18. He claims 
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that all three of the charges arose from a single criminal 
episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1990), and 
that, pursuant to rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 and -403 (1990), entry of his guilty 
plea to the false information charge effectively bars the 
subsequent theft and possession prosecutions.3 Id. 
The trial court held that the charges did not arise 
from a single criminal episode, but were comprised of different 
offenses arising under different statutes, were prosecutable in 
different jurisdictions, and were punishable by different 
penalties (Tr. 121-25). Addendum A. Of primary importance to 
the court, however, was the fact that the offenses did not share 
the same criminal objective (Tr. 121-22). Addendum A. The court 
noted that the objective of the theft was to permanently deprive 
the owner of his property, and that any objective to possessing 
drugs had no relationship to the offense of giving false 
information to a police officer (Tr. 122) . Addendum A. The 
court went on to note that the false information went only to 
defendant's identity and that the reasons for giving the false 
information were not before him: 
. . . [Defendant's] purpose and objective of giving 
false information to a police officer was not to reveal 
his name. For whatever reason, that is not before me 
at this time. 
There has been some speculation that the reason 
why he said that is to prevent [himself] from being 
discovered on all the other criminal conduct, i.e. 
3
 Defendant does not present a constitutional double jeopardy 
argument. 
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possession of the controlled substance as well as [the] 
theft case, but then that is just speculative before 
me. There is no indication to indicate that before me 
at all. So, the difference in criminal objective in my 
mind is one of the main difference[s] . . . . 
(Tr. 122-23). Addendum A. 
B. The Offenses Did Not Encompass A Single Criminal Objective 
And, Hence, Did Not Arise From A Single Criminal Episode 
This appeal turns on the issue of whether the three 
offenses arose from a single criminal episode. Section 76-1-401 
defines "single criminal episode" as encompassing "all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Addendum B. 
The issue below and on appeal deals with the "single 
criminal objective" requirement. Defendant provides a myriad of 
reasons on appeal for having given Officer Handle a false name: 
deflecting attention from himself, covering up the theft, 
avoiding detection of the controlled substances he possessed, 
preventing discovery of his prior criminal history, minimizing 
the suspicion his own name may have aroused in the officer, and 
minimizing the duration of the encounter with the officer. Br. 
of App. at 12. He then claims that the real objective was to 
avoid being caught for the theft and possession offenses. Id. at 
13. While any one or combination of these reasons may have been 
the motivation behind defendant's use of his brother's name, only 
the last objective was presented to the trial court (R. 122-23; 
Tr. 104, 117). The remaining reasons are presented for the first 
time on appeal and are not supported by the record. Accordingly, 
they are not properly before this Court. See, e.g., State v. 
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Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to matters 
outside the record will not be considered); State v. Hutchinas, 
672 P.2d 404, 405 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (appellate court will 
not review allegations of facts outside the record on appeal); 
State v. Truiillo, 656 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) 
(appellate courts "are generally precluded from addressing 
matters outside the record"). 
Further, as the trial court noted, there was no 
evidence offered below to support the objective of avoiding 
arrest for the possession and theft offenses; defense counsel 
merely raised the objective in his argument to the court (R. 122-
23; Tr. 104, 117). The facts suggest that the false information 
offense was a spontaneous one committed without a clear 
objective. The evidence established that defendant stole a 
circular saw, put it on the back seat of his car and drove from 
the site of the theft only to be immediately stopped by a police 
officer. He had no identification or driver's license with him. 
Despite counsel's speculation, it is not apparent from the record 
how giving a false name under these circumstances would reduce 
the possibility that defendant's crimes would be discovered. 
Regardless of the name he used, he was still likely to be 
detained long enough to receive a citation for driving without a 
license, and the saw remained in plain view of the officer, 
leaving no clear benefit from using a false name. While one 
could speculate as to the reasons a false name would be 
preferable to defendant's own name under these circumstances--
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e.g., there was an outstanding warrant under his own name for 
which he might immediately be arrested, or he preferred that any 
ticket he received be the responsibility of his brother--the fact 
remains that there is no evidence to support defendant's alleged 
criminal objective. On these facts, the trial court reached the 
logical conclusion that the objective behind giving a false name 
was to avoid giving his true name (Tr. 122-23). That objective 
has no relationship to either of the remaining offenses at issue. 
As defendant offered no evidence to support his speculation that 
his objective was to avoid capture for his previous crimes, his 
claim of a single criminal objective is without merit, and the 
appeal should be dismissed. 
Even assuming that the false information was given, at 
least in part, to avoid capture for both the theft and possession 
offenses, the crimes still do not arise from a single criminal 
episode under section 76-1-401. To hold otherwise would permit 
defendant to escape the demands of justice by simply linking 
unrelated criminal offenses with an additional offense in an 
attempt to avoid detection of the crimes. This result has been 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the 
defendant stole an automobile and, while driving it, was involved 
in a high-speed chase with a police officer the following day. 
Id. at 577. Addendum C. He was charged with theft and failure 
to stop at the command of a police officer. Id. On separate 
complaints, he was convicted first of "unlawful taking of a 
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vehicle," then of failing to stop. Id. On appeal, he argued 
that the two offenses arose from a single criminal episode and 
that, therefore, prosecution for failing to stop was barred by 
his earlier conviction. Id. The supreme court found that the 
objective of the unlawful taking "was to obtain possession, be it 
permanent or temporary, of another's automobile." Id. at 578. 
It found the objective of failing to stop "was to avoid arrest 
for the traffic violations he had just committed and/or to avoid 
being found in a stolen motor vehicle." Id. Accordingly, the 
court held that the objectives as well as the proof requirements 
of the two offenses were different and that they did not warrant 
treatment as a single criminal episode. Id. The Court reasoned 
that to hold otherwise "would mean that any crime a defendant 
commits to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity would be part 
of the same criminal episode. This does not appear to be the 
intent of the statute . . . ." Id. 
Likewise, the mere fact that defendant in this case 
committed a crime (giving false information) to avoid arrest for 
two unrelated, prior criminal offenses does not entitle him to 
treat all the offenses as arising from a single criminal episode 
under section 76-1-401. Cornish, 571 P.2d at 578. Addendum C. 
The objective of theft is to obtain possession of another's 
property, and the offense was completed at the time defendant 
removed the saw from the construction site. See id. The 
objective of possessing a controlled substance, while not 
elaborated on below, has no connection to the theft, except for 
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the coincidental presence of the controlled substance in the car. 
These offenses are distinct from each other and from the false 
information offense, the proof requirements of the three offenses 
differ, and the possibility that the false information may have 
been given, in part, to avoid being caught for the prior two 
offenses does not create a common criminal objective sufficient 
to meet the "single criminal episode" definition of section 76-1-
401. See id. Consequently, defendant's claim is without merit, 
and his conviction should be affirmed. 
C. Defendant's Waiver Argument Is Not Properly Before This 
Court; Further, The State Did Not Concede That The Offenses Arose 
From A Single Criminal Episode By Charging All Three Offenses In 
A Single Information 
Defendant argues that the fact that the county attorney 
included all three charges in a single information in the 
district court amounts to a concession by the State that the 
offenses arise from a single criminal episode. Br. of App. at 
15-16. This Court should not reach this argument because it is 
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 
149, 155 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (appellate court will not consider 
on appeal an objection not raised below); State ex rel. E.D. v. 
E.J.D., 876 P.2d 397, 402 (Utah App. 1994) (appellate court 
refuses to address an issue raised for the first time on appeal); 
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
Even on the merits, the claim must fail as the State 
did not concede the issue below. While rule 9.5, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, requires that all offenses arising from a 
single criminal episode be charged in a single information 
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(Addendum B), the converse of that statement is not necessarily 
true: multiple offenses charged in a single information do not 
necessarily arise from a single criminal episode. Prosecutors 
have broad latitude to charge multiple offenses in a single 
information, and the basis for the joinder may be other than a 
common criminal episode. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(a) (Supp. 
1994) (permitting such a filing if the offenses are "based on the 
same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission" QT are "alleged to have been part of a common scheme 
or plan") (emphasis added); cf. State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah 
App.) (approving of the charging in one document of two separate 
robberies with parallel fact patterns), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1992). Moreover, the State's active defense against 
defendant's claim of a single criminal episode belies any claim 
that the State believed otherwise when it filed the information. 
D. Because The Offenses Did Not Arise From A Single Criminal 
Objective, Defendant's Claim That The District Court Filing Was 
Barred Bv The Rules Of Criminal Procedure And State Statute 
Necessarily Fails 
Finally, defendant asserts that rule 9.5 and sections 
76-1-401(2) and 76-1-403(1) bar the prosecution of the theft and 
possession charges in district court because he pled guilty to 
the false information charge in the circuit court. Br. of App. 
at 17-18. He argues that rule 9.5 and section 76-1-401(2) 
mandate that all three charges be brought in the district court 
as that court had jurisdiction over the offense with the highest 
possible penalty of the three charges. He then asserts the 
procedural bar in section 76-1-403, which prohibits prosecution 
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of an offense after a conviction has been entered for another 
offense which arose from the same criminal episode. By their 
express terms, rule 9.5 and sections 76-1-402(2) and -403(1) 
require a threshold determination that the three charges arose 
from a single criminal episode. See Addendum B. As established 
above, this threshold condition has not been met. Hence, this 
Court need not reach defendant's final asseirtion of error.4 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State does not believe that oral argument would be 
beneficial in this case or that a published opinion is warranted. 
Defendant's request to the contrary rests solely on his final 
argument, which need not be reached unless defendant prevails on 
his initial claim that the charges in this case arose from a 
single criminal episode. As Utah Supreme Court case law is 
4
 Defendant argues that so long as the district court has 
jurisdiction over one of several offenses arising from a single 
criminal episode, all the charges must be brought in the district 
court. Br. of App. at 17-18. However, the bright-line rule 
defendant advocates has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that it had previously ff [taken] care to avoid a rigid 
rule mandating joinder whenever a defendant commits a crime to 
avoid arrest for prior criminal activity, [State v. Cornish, 571 
P.2d 577,] 578". IcL at 61. The Court explained that its "failure 
to announce that such conduct always warrants joinder does not 
preclude us from concluding that under some circumstances, joinder 
may be proper.11 Id. Hence, where a defendant commits a crime to 
avoid arrest for prior criminal activity, a per se joinder rule is 
not appropriate. 
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contrary to defendant's position, there is no reason to schedule 
oral argument or to render a published opinion. However, should 
this Court reach defendant's final point, a published opinion 
would be helpful to trial courts and trial counsel, but oral 
argument would not be beneficial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
 //5_7'day of February, 
1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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1 here. These charges haven't been severed. They have just 
2 been selectively chosen and I think the fault lies with 
3 West Valley City prosecutor's office for picking the one 
4 they could go on quickly and knowing about the existence of 
5 other ones. And I believe that under the provision we have 
6 stated to the court that Mr. Strayer is entitled dismissal 
7 on those remaining counts. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mack. 
9 Mr. Hamp, can you give the court any guidance as 
10 to when the increased jurisdiction of the circuit court 
11 included charges as misdemeanors? 
12 MR. HAMP: I can't give you any dates as to when 
13 that began. I think the Nest Valley City prosecutor was 
14 not including that until this years to allow them to 
15 prosecute cases as misdemeanors. Indeed that has been 
16 constitutionally challenged to the point we are not 
17 allowing them to do that. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that. 
19 Both sides submit it? 
20 MR. HAMP: I'd submit it at this time, your 
21 Honor. 
22 MR. MACK: Yes, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: It is to be noted that even though 
24 there was extensive argument, both legal and factually in 
25 the matter previously indicated, no memorandum was supplied 
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1 by either side in this matter• The examination of 
2 76-1-402, 76-1-403 as well as Rule 9.5, it is the opinion 
3 of the court that Rule 9.5 says distinctly what the state 
4 attempted to do in this matter. If you are going to charge 
5 someone with a crime you charge them with the higher crime, 
6 and the court with its jurisdiction to do that they have 
7 alleged in their information, three counts possession of a 
8 controlled substance, a felony; a false information to a 
9 piece officer, Class C Misdemeanor; and the theft, a Class 
10 A Misdemeanor. 
11 However, the problem herein lies with the fact 
12 that pursuant to the jurisdiction of West Valley City 
13 prosecutor's and the Third Circuit Court as to misdemeanors 
14 another matter was filed in there, that being the Class C 
15 Misdemeanor, false information to a police officer. The 
16 office of the prosecutor of the West Valley City does not 
17 have jurisdiction to prosecute felonies as Mr. Hamp has 
18 indicated, which the court recognizes now and agrees with. 
19 There has been an attempt to increase the jurisdiction of 
20 the city prosecutor to include a Class A Misdemeanor but 
21 that has come under constitutional attack. 
22 The question in my mind is unsettled. Regardless 
23 of which, it is my opinion that at the time, that being 
24 September 3rd of 1992, wherein the defendant entered a 
25 guilty plea to the Class C Misdemeanor, jurisdiction was 
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1 not increased to include Class A jurisdiction for West 
2 Valley City prosecutors; therefore, the only crime which 
3 the West Valley City prosecutor and the court, the Third 
4 Circuit Court at that time, had jurisdiction over was only 
5 that of Class B Misdemeanor of the—of the Class C 
6 Misdemeanor false information to a police officer. 
7 Mow, the issue is: Does it then have a bar to 
8 subsequent prosecution? If I find there was in fact a 
9 single criminal episode in this matter, then that would bar 
10 the subsequent offense via the information that is filed in 
11 this matter. It is my finding that there was not a single 
12 criminal episode in this case. There was not a common 
13 objective of all the different offenses involved here. 
14 The offenses could have been prosecuted under 
15 different statutes, under different jurisdictions, which is 
16 very, very fact specific and very important in this 
17 decision, as well as the fact there were different 
18 penalties that may have been as a result of which and is 
19 indicated only the one, the Class C Misdemeanor with the 
20 city prosecutor of West Valley having jurisdiction to 
21 proceed upon. 
22 With there being difference in both the criminal 
23 objective as well as the objections in this matter, I find 
24 there is no single criminal episode which would 
25 subsequently bar the filing of the information indicating 
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1 the theft and possession of controlled substance, felony 
2 and Class A Misdemeanor. 
3 However, as to the false information to a peace 
4 officer, I find that that is barred by a prior jeopardy 
5 which has been contained in 76-1*403, as to subsequent 
6 prosecution for the same crime which is a bit different 
7 than the single criminal episode but as to the basis of 
8 double jeopardy or twice in jeopardy, the court finds that 
9 is identical. Count II will therefore be dismissed, 
10 subsequent prosecution, though, on Counts I and III 
11 remaining counts will be allowed. 
12 MR. MACK: Your Honor, I have a question if I 
13 could, just for clarification. 
14 THE COURT: Yes. 
15 MR. MACK: If you're finding that was not a 
16 single criminal episode—the word slips me that you 
17 used—it was basically because—well, would you mind if you 
18 restate what your basis for— 
19 THE COURT: I believe the difference was the 
20 difference in criminal objective. You have a theft which 
21 is objective as to taking, permanently deprive. If that be 
22 the case, whatever, an objection of taking drugs has no 
23 indication or no nexus to the fact that he gave false 
24 information to a police officer. His identity for the 
25 purpose and the objective of giving false information to a 
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1 police officer was not to reveal his name. For whatever 
2 reason, that is not before me at this time. 
3 There has been some speculation that the reason 
4 why he said that is to prevent from being discovered on all 
5 the other criminal conduct, i.e. possession of the 
6 controlled substance as well as theft case, but then that 
7 is just speculative before me. There is no indication to 
8 indicate that before me at all. So, the difference in 
9 criminal objective in my mind is one of the main difference 
10 and I will read that directly out of 76-1*401: single 
11 criminal episode means all conduct which is closely related 
12 in time—which it may or may not have been. I don't know 
13 when the theft allegedly took place in relation to the 
14 stop. I do know the stop and the possession charge was 
15 closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
16 accomplishment of a single criminal objective. I find 
17 there is no single criminal objective in the matter, 
18 therefore, there is no single criminal episode. 
19 MR. MACK: Tour Honor, would you also consider 
20 the statement of the officer—I believe he made—that he 
21 was—how he became aware of this entire situation: As he 
22 was sitting in the cars filing out paperwork, he saw this 
23 activity nearby and I would submit to the court that that 
24 would indicate a close proximity so he could see what was 
25 happening. The person came over and that's when the stop 
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1 was made. 
2 THE COURT: I have no problem with that at all# 
3 Mr. Mack. My problem is the single criminal objective. 
4 MR. MACK: I understand that. 
5 THE COURT: And I find that is fact demonstrative 
6 and fact-sensitive. That's what I am ruling on now. 
7 MR. MACK: Okay. 
8 THE COURT: So, Mr. Hamp, be so kind to prepare 
9 an order in this matter. I don't think we set a trial 
10 date. 
11 MR. MACK: We had set a motion. 
12 THE COURT: Is it a disposition? 
13 MR. MACK: Well, I think a disposition probably. 
14 But let's see, might I have just a moment to confer? 
15 THE COURT: Sure. 
16 MR. MACK: Well, your Honor, I think probably at 
17 this point it would be best to put it on for disposition. 
18 THE COURT: How long will it take you to get—how 
19 about the 6th of December at 9:00? That's two weeks. Is 
20 that enough time? 
21 MR. HEMP: Tour Honor, I think by then we could 
22 either have an answer as to whether or not we can actually 
23 dispose of the case or have an answer as to trial. 
24 THE COURT: And I would suggest under the 
25 circumstance that some effort be made to dispose of the 
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ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 to 403 (1990) 
Rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-401 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 
•1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 203. 
Law § 227. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 152. 
76*1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of limi-
tations has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of 
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser 
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser 
and included offense against which the statute of limitations has fun shall not 
be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 
History: C 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, t 76-1-305. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal OJ.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 198. 
Law § 225. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=> 145V2. 
PART 4 
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE 
•JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single crimi-
nal episode'' means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident 
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of 
Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings. 
History: C 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L. cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For 
1973, eh. 196, I 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, I 1. the present comparable provision, see Rule 9, 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77-21-31, R. Crim. P. 
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76-1-402 CRIMINAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALY8I8 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Conduct constituting separate crimes. 
—Property pawned separately. 
Traffic offenses. 
Cited. 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
viduals is a single act and a single offense if 
evidence shows that the items were retained 
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items 
were the subject of a previous prosecution for 
related offenses, a second prosecution was pre-
cluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 
1983). 
Conduct constituting separate crimes. 
Where defendant committed a robbery in one 
county, and later, in another county some 65 
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and de-
cided to kidnap them as hostages, the differ-
ence in time, location, and the criminal objec-
tives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the 
conduct separate crimes rather than one single 
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 
1206 (Utah 1977). 
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the 
failure to stop at the command of a police offi-
cer were two separate offenses, and not a single 
episode, because the two offenses occurred a 
day apart and the criminal objective in the un-
lawful taking was to obtain possession while 
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was 
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v. 
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant's actions did not constitute a "sin-
gle criminal episode" since he committed two 
separate burglaries by breaking into two sepa-
rate buildings within an apartment complex, 
even though the burglaries were only 20 
minutes apart. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1985). 
—Property pawned separately. 
Where property was stolen and defendant re-
ceived and pawned it on three separate days 
spread over a period of 18 days, the offenses did 
not arise out of a single criminal episode. State 
v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986). 
Traffic offenses. 
This section does not prevent the prosecution 
of a drunk driving charge under § 41-6-44 af-
ter the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving 
without a license, without a registration certif-
icate and without a safety sticker, since the 
citations charge separate offenses entirely un-
related to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 
P 2d 253 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 
P.2d 631 (Utah 1988); State v. Fletcher, 751 
P.2d 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega, 
751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 20. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 29. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all sepa-
rate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of" the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense, 
1973, ch. 196,5 76-1-402; L. 1974, ch. 32, § 2. Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const., 
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act Amend. V; $ 77-1-6. 
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violat-
ing another statute, § 76-6-704. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Act." 
Judgment entered for included offense after re-
versal of conviction. 
Jurisdiction of a single court. 
Lesser included offense. 
—Aggravated assault. 
—Aggravated robbery. 
—Attempted homicide. 
—Forcible sexual abuse. 
—Instructions. 
—Joy riding. 
—Manslaughter. 
—Negligent homicide. 
—Theff. 
Misdemeanor and felony charga*. 
Separate offenses. 
—Automobile violations. 
—Burglary and larceny. 
—Remoteness in time. 
—Sex offenses. 
Cited. 
"Act." 
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not 
only volitional acts of a defendant, but also the 
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a 
defendant. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Judgment entered for included offense af-
ter reversal of conviction. 
Where there was insufficient evidence to 
support defendant's conviction for second de-
gree murder, but there was sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the included offense 
of manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to 
this section, vacated and set aside the convic-
tion of second degree murder on appeal and 
entered a judgment of conviction for the in-
cluded offense of manslaughter. State v. 
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk 
of death was insufficient to support defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder, but there 
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to sup-
port a conviction of the included offense of 
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial 
court with directions to set aside the verdict 
and to enter a judgment of conviction for man-
slaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 
(Utah 1985). 
Jurisdiction of a single court. 
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the 
13 
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the entering did not include and was indepen- v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
dent of the larceny; each offense required dif- cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
ferent acts and former 9 76-1-23 did not pre- __« — 
elude conviction on both burglary and larceny ««* ° e n # ®*' r j . .. . A • . . 
charges. State v. Jones. 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 . ™ T a n
 #
aC
 / !P1? P e n e t r a t , o n P™*** 
P 2d 262 (1962) penile contact, and the former act was in no 
uw^i .
 w a y neceasary to t h e | a t t e r a c t t n e t w o a c t 8 
—Remoteness in time. w e r e n o t P*rt °f t h e "same act" and could sup-
Where defendant was charged with theft of P°»*-two counts of aggravated sexual assault 
an operable motor vehicle which occurred in htu^ o n •»!>•«*• a c t a of forcible sexual abuse 
1981 and possession of a stolen vehicle occur- ? n ^ f o ^ L e , ***** S t a t e v Youn*» 7 8 ° p 2d 
ring in 1985, because of the remoteness in time 1 2 3 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) 
of the two oflenses, Subsection (3) cannot bar Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 
convictions of both offenses, as that subsection (Utah 1986); State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah 
is limited to and defined by "separate offenses 1987); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 
arising out of a single criminal episode." State 1988); State v. Tuttle, 780 P. 2d 1203 (1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments C.J.8. — 22 C J S Criminal Law § 14. 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal A.L.R. — Seizure or detention for purpose of 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- constituting separate crime of kidnaping, 43 
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. A.L R 3d 699. 
Rev. 177. Lesser-related state oflense instructions: 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal modern status, 50 A.L.R.4th 1081. 
Law § 20. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 29. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prose-
cution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a differ-
ent offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be estab-
lished to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not 
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense 
is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
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(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination 
takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, 
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defen-
dant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in confor-
mity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 
1*13, ch. 196, 5 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, I 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Severed counts. 
This section does not mandate dismissal if 
counts were properly severed. Thus, where a 
magistrate severed counts "to promote justice" 
and the district court later refused to rejoin 
them for the same reason after defendant had 
been convicted on one of the counts, the case 
was not one that "should have been tried under 
i 76-1-402." State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Utah 
1987). 
Cited in State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 
(Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal son as bar to subsequent prosecution for rob-
Law § 243 et seq. bery of another person committed at the same 
C.J.S. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law ft 208. time, 51 A L.R.3d 693. 
A.L.R. — Prosecution for robbery of one per- Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 161. 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in other 
jurisdiction barring prosecution in state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, 
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subse-
quent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined 
ANALYSIS 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Severed counts. 
Cited. 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
viduals is a single act and a single offense 
when evidence shows that the items were re-
tained simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen 
items were the subject of a previous prosecu-
tion for related oflenses, a second prosecution 
was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 
(Utah 1983). 
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Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1993, designated as 
"(a)" and rewrote the existing provisions, delet-
ing "other than an infraction" after "offense," 
and added Subdivisions (b) to (e). 
Cross-References. — Counsel for indigent 
defendants, § 77-32-1 et seq. 
Defense costs in criminal actions, convicted 
defendants may be ordered to pay, § 77-32a-l 
et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Determination of indigency. 
—Appeal. 
Self-representation. 
Determination of indigency. 
—Appeal. 
The determination of indigency is a question 
of fact to be determined by the trial court; once 
that determination has been made, it is enti-
tled to the same presumptions of correctness as 
other trial court findings and determinations; 
therefore, the person attacking that finding 
has the burden to prove it is in error. Webster 
v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978). 
Self-representation. 
Because the exercise of the right to defend 
oneself in a criminal prosecution necessarily 
constitutes a waiver of the important right to 
professional counsel, trial courts have an affir-
mative duty to determine that a defendant who 
chooses self-representation does so knowingly 
and intelligently. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). 
Trial court did not err in allowing defendant 
to represent himself, after the court properly 
inquired into defendant's wish to represent 
himself, and properly took defendant's ques-
tionable mental health into account in consid-
ering the request. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). 
The choice to represent oneself does not auto-
matically give defendant access to research re-
sources enjoyed by professional counsel. State 
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, £36 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
A foreign-national defendant had a constitu-
tional right to defend himself if he chose to do 
so, notwithstanding his limited understanding 
of English and of the U.S. judicial system; the 
trial court deprived him of that right when it 
applied an incorrect legal standard, consider-
ing the defendant's best interests and his tech-
nical ability to manage his own defense. More-
over, because the court's determination that 
the defendant could not knowingly and intelli-
gently choose self-representation was not sup-
ported either by the facts or by any meaningful 
inquiry into the defendant's ability to under-
stand the risks of self-representation, the case 
was remanded to allow defendant to represent 
himself. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Judicial Jabber-
wocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection? 
Strickland v. Washington and National Stan-
dards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723. 
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of 
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal 
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183. 
Rule 9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 201, § 2 re-
pealed former § 77-35-9, and thus this rule, 
effective April 23, 1990. For present compara-
ble provisions, see § 77-8a-l. See also State v. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepre-
sentation, or failure to advise, of immigration 
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65 
A.L.R.4th 719. 
What constitutes assertion of right to coun-
sel following Miranda warnings — federal 
cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622. 
Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (applying § 77-8a-l 
instead of this rule, finding that the repeal of 
the statute operated to repeal the rule). 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single 
court 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informa-
tions charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state 
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a sin-
gle criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest 
possible penalty of ail the offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not 
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the com-
plaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, 
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
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STATE v. 
Cite as 57 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Edward Lane CORNISH, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 14782. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted in Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. 
Hanson, Jr., J., of failure to stop at the 
command of a police officer, and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant's failure to stop did not arise out of 
the same "single criminal episode" as that 
which justified his prior conviction for un-
lawful taking, and that double jeopardy 
therefore did not prevent his conviction on 
charges of failing to stop. 
Affirmed. 
Criminal Law *-202(1) 
Where defendant was arrested after 
high-speed chase and after he stopped vehi-
cle in which he was riding and ran into field 
where he was taken into custody, defend-
ant's conviction for failure to stop at com-
mand of police officer, occurring after he 
was convicted of unlawful taking of vehicle 
in which he was riding, was not barred by 
principles of double jeopardy, since actions 
serving as basis for second conviction did 
not take place as part of same "single crimi-
nal episode" as those serving as basis for 
unlawful taking conviction. U.C.A.1953, 
41-1-109, 76-1-401, 76-1-403. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Larry R. Keller and Ronald J. Yengich of 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., William W. 
Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
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PER CURIAM: 
Defendant was convicted of failure 
stop at the command of a police officei 
class A misdemeanor. 
Briefly stated. On June 19, 1976, < 
Dotson parked his car at a lounge. Wl 
he returned some seven hours later it \ 
gone and Dotson reported it to the pol 
On June 21, 1976, at about 1:30 a. 
Officer Harris gave chase to the stolen 
hide traveling in the wrong lane of traf 
After a high-speed chase, defends 
stopped the car and ran into a field wh< 
he was taken into custody. 
The only issue involved the interpretat 
of Utah Code Ann., Sec. 76-1-403 (Su| 
1975), and what is meant by a "single crii 
nal episode." Defendant was origina 
charged with failure to stop at the co 
mand of a police officer and with the 
Pursuant to a motion by the State, sepan 
complaints were later filed. Defends 
was convicted of the crime of "unlaw! 
taking of a vehicle" under Sec. 41-1-K 
U.C.A.1953. 
Subsequent to the conviction for unla 
ful taking, the instant suit was commenc 
for failure to stop. Because the evider 
was the same at both trials, it was stipul; 
ed that the transcript of the earlier tr 
could be introduced as the sum total of 
the evidence. Defendant claims the t\ 
offenses were sufficiently related to cons 
tute a "single criminal episode," and th 
the trial for failure to stop was prohibit 
by statute and was in violation of state ai 
federal protections against double jeopard 
We disagree and affirm the convictic 
The phrase "single criminal episode" w 
defined by the legislature in Utah Co 
Ann., Sec. 76-1-401 (Supp. 1975) as follow 
In this part unless the context requir 
different definition, 'single criminal e\ 
sode' means all conduct which is close 
related in time and is incident to an a 
tempt or an accomplishment of a sing 
criminal objective. [Emphasis added.] 
Not only were the two offenses charge 
separated in time by approximately one ft 
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day, but they also were separate in objec-
tive. The objective of the unlawful taking 
was to obtain possession, be it permanent or 
temporary, of another's automobile. It was 
a completed offense at the time the car was 
taken. The objective of the failure to stop 
was to avoid arrest for the traffic violations 
he had just committed and/or to avoid be-
ing found in a stolen motor vehicle. To 
treat them as a single criminal episode 
would mean that any crime a defendant 
commits to avoid arrest for prior criminal 
activity would be part of the same criminal 
episode. This does not appear to be the 
intent of the statute and although the testi-
mony given may overlap, the offenses are 
different and the proof requirements are 
different Because the offenses are dis-
tinct, the question of double jeopardy does 
not even arise, as that protection relates to 
prosecutions more than once for a single 
offense.1 
[O I KEY NUIfKR SYSTEM 
Tfce STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
iMMid L. SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 14859. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 17, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart 
M. Hanson, Jr., J., of issuing a bad check 
and theft by deception and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that: 
(1) defendant's warning the payee that 
there were insufficient funds to cover the 
check did not raise the defense of voluntary 
termination and entitle defendant to an in-
struction thereon where defendant, at the 
time he warned payee, had already issued 
the check, had taken possession of a deed in 
exchange for the check, had transferred the 
property to a third party, and the account 
on which the check was drawn had been 
closed the previous day; (2) the prosecutor's 
approaching the bench and holding a discus-
sion in front of the jury after receiving a 
negative answer from defendant as to 
whether he had ever been convicted of a 
felony was not prejudicial, and (3) an in-
struction, "where a person intentionally 
does that which the law declares to be a 
crime, he is acting with criminal intent, 
even though he may not know that his act 
or conduct is unlawful," was not erroneous. 
Affirmed. 
1. False Pretenses <*»52 
In prosecution for issuing bad check 
and theft by deception, defendant's warn-
ing payee that there were insufficient 
funds to cover check did not raise defense 
of voluntary termination and entitle de-
fendant to instruction thereon where, when 
defendant warned payee, he had already 
issued check, had taken possession of deed 
in exchange therefor, had transferred prop-
erty to third party, and account on which 
check was drawn had been closed the day 
prior to the offense. 
2. Criminal Law «=> 706(1), 1037.1(3), 
1037.2 
After prosecutor received negative an-
swer from defendant to question whether 
he had ever been convicted of felony, prose-
cutor's approaching bench and having dis-
cussion in front of jury, but out of their 
hearing, did not prejudicially imply that 
defendant in fact had prior felony convic-
tion; and furthermore, where no objection 
was made by defense counsel and no re-
quest for cautionary instruction was made, 
issue was not preserved for appeal. 
3. Criminal Law *=> 772(5) 
In prosecution for issuing bad check 
and theft by deception, instruction, "where 
1. Green v. V. S.t 355 U.S. 184. 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199. 
STATE V. 
CRe as 571 
a person intentionally does that which the 
law declares to be a crime, he is acting with 
criminal intent, even though he may not 
know that his act or conduct is unlawful," 
was not erroneous. 
David Paul White, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., William 
W. Barrett, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent 
WILKINS, Justice: 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of 
issuing a bad check and theft by deception, 
under Sections 76-6-505 and 76-6-405, re-
spectively, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, and sentenced by the District 
Court for Salt Lake County, to the indeter-
minate term of one to fifteen years. On 
appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his con-
viction on both counts and contends that: 
(1) Warning the payee that there are insuf-
ficient funds to cover the check raises a 
defense of voluntary termination and the 
trial court committed error in refusing to 
instruct the jury thereon; (2) The prosecu-
tor's examination of defendant on the ques-
tion of prior felony convictions was reversi-
ble error; and (3) That an instruction was 
misleading, causing prejudice to defend-
ant's case. Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
Defendant was in the business of pro-
moting sporting events, and these activities 
brought him in contact with James Eakins, 
a professional athlete. Beginning in June, 
1975, Mr. Eakins had several discussions 
with defendant concerning the sale of the 
Eakins' home. On or about October 20, 
1975, defendant called Mr. Eakins to inform 
him that he had obtained a loan that would 
enable him to purchase the home. Later 
that week, Mr. and Mrs. Eakins met with 
defendant to prepare and sign the deed. 
However, defendant stated that he did not 
have any money with him, and the delivery 
of the deed did not take place. A meeting 
was arranged for the following day, Octo-
ber 23, 1975. Defendant arrived but 
claimed to have forgotten the check. De-
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fendant then suggested that Mr. Eakins 
give him the deed, and he and Mrs. Eakins 
could return to his office and pick up the 
check. The deed was delivered to defend-
ant, but the check was not given to Mrs. 
Eakins because defendant maintained that 
a second signature was necessary. Defend-
ant obtained this signature and delivered a 
check to Mrs. Eakins on October 24,1975, in 
the amount of $32,453.51. Mrs. Eakins tes-
tified that defendant told her not to cash 
the check immediately because the neces-
sary funds were in another account, but 
that they would be transferred by one 
o'clock that same day. Defendant main-
tains that he did not say that the funds 
would be transferred by one o'clock, but 
that he said he would call by one o'clock to 
let her know if they had been transferred. 
Nevertheless, the funds that were supposed 
to have been transferred were apparently 
nonexistent The account on which the 
check was drawn was closed on October 23, 
1975, one day before the check in question 
was written, although it was not shown 
that defendant was aware of this. On that 
day the account was closed by the bank, as 
it was overdrawn by 539.70. The highest 
balance in the entire record of the account 
was $1044.40. The check was not honored. 
On this same October 23, and prior to the 
issuing of this check, defendant had trans-
ferred title to the property to a Mr. Crow-
ley in satisfaction of a.previous debt, and 
Mr. Crowley had mortgaged the property 
[1] As to the offense of issuing a bad 
check, defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it 
is a defense if the maker informs the payee 
that there are insufficient funds to covei 
the check. Defendant asserts that the evi 
dence supports such an instruction am 
cites, as the applicable statute, Section 76-
2-307, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a 
amended: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prose 
cution in which an actor's criminal re 
sponsibility arises from his own conduc 
that prior to the commission o 
the offense, the actor voluntarily termi 
nated his effort to promote or facilitat 
its commission and either: 
